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Abstrak
Mengevaluasi luaran kebijakan luar negeri terdahulu merupakan hal yang penting bagi negara
manapun guna mempelajari wawasan mengenai kebijakan, mengapresiasi pengalaman, dan
memperbaiki praktik kebijakan luar negeri di masa depan. Untuk mendapatkan wawasan tersebut,
tulisan ini menggunakan kerangka yang digagas oleh Baldwin dalam menilai kesuksesan dan
kegagalan kebijakan luar negeri. Melalui studi kasus, artikel ini menilai upaya Amerika Serikat (A.S.)
untuk memengaruhi Indonesia dalam menyelesaikan krisis kemanusiaan di Timor Timur pada tahun
1999. Keputusan Presiden Clinton dalam memengaruhi Indonesia ditujukan untuk mengubah
kebijakan Indonesia sembari mendapatkan dukungan dari aliansi A.S. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa
keputusan Clinton membuahkan kesuksesan. Temuan ini didasarkan pada beberapa faktor: (1) upaya
yang dilakukan A.S. secara efektif berhasil mencapai tujuan primer dan sekunder dengan
keberhasilan yang sangat tinggi; (2) upaya tersebut dilakukan dengan konsekuensi yang minim bagi
A.S.; (3) upaya tersebut menimbulkan konsekuensi yang tinggi bagi Indonesia; (4) meningkatnya
kepentingan Clinton memperkuat komitmen A.S. untuk memengaruhi Indonesia; dan (5) Clinton
berhasil melakukan upaya sulitnya mengingat lebih tingginya kepentingan Indonesia di Timor Timur.
Penemuan-penemuan tersebut memberikan pelajaran penting bagi pemangku kebijakan luar negeri
A.S. dan Indonesia dalam memetakan hubungan bagi kedua negara di masa depan.

Kata kunci:
analisis kebijakan luar negeri, evaluasi Kebijakan luar negeri, Amerika Serikat, Indonesia, Timor-Leste

Abstract
Assessing the output of past foreign policy is instrumental for any country to learn policy-relevant
insights, to appreciate its experience, and to improve its future conduct. To glean such insights, this
article borrows Baldwin’s framework in assessing the success and failure in foreign policy. Using a
case study analysis, it assesses the United States’ (U.S.) influence attempt towards Indonesia to resolve
the 1999 East Timor humanitarian crisis. President Clinton’s decision to undergo an influence attempt
primarily aimed to change Indonesia’s policy while gaining support from U.S. allies in the process.
The article finds that Clinton’s decision was a highly successful attempt. This finding is based on
several factors: (1) the attempt effectively attained the intended primary and secondary goals at a
considerably high degree; (2) it was conducted at a considerably low cost for the U.S.; (3) it inflicted
a high cost towards Indonesia; (4) the increase in Clinton’s stake strengthened the U.S. resolve to
pursue the influence attempt; and (5) Clinton had successfully overcome the difficult undertaking as
Indonesia possessed higher stake over East Timor. These findings provide some lessons for both U.S.
and Indonesian foreign policymakers to chart future relations for the two nations.

Keywords:
foreign policy analysis, foreign policy evaluation, United States of America, Indonesia, Timor-Leste
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INTRODUCTION
Assessing the past foreign policy is vital for the betterment of any nation’s future foreign
policymaking. This notion suggests that if any country aims to continuously improve its
conduct of foreign policy, it ought to learn from its experience no matter how hard and
unappealing the lessons of its history.1 One subfield that is dedicated to studying the links
between the theory and practice of International Relations (IR) is the study of foreign
policy analysis (FPA) (Hudson & Vore, 1995). This subfield mainly scrutinises various
aspects in the conduct of foreign policy and also contributes to the production of policyrelevant knowledge for decision-makers (Walt, 2005).
Within the vast literature on FPA, scholars also engage with the topic of Foreign
Policy Evaluation (FPE): a topic that specifically focuses on the output of foreign policy,
rather than the process of a particular country’s foreign policymaking. Yet despite its
valuable insights for both the policy and the academic community, the body of literature
published in both academic as well as professional journals fairly neglects such an
important topic (Baldwin, 2000). As David Baldwin (2000, pp. 168-170) contemplates,
one of the reasons that might lead the study of foreign policy evaluation remains to be
neglected is its deeply fragmented nature, full of analytical and conceptual anarchy. In
addition, the empirical research dedicated to the FPE—like its main subfields, FPA—
predominantly revolves around the experience of great power’s foreign policy, mostly
Western democracies like the United States (U.S.).2 As a result, the study on the topic of
lesser power foreign policy evaluation remains to be understudied.
To fill in this caveat, this article intends to contribute an empirical analysis on FPE
by examining the case of U.S. foreign policy on Indonesia in resolving the 1999 East
Timor crisis. The 1999 East Timor Crisis has been a widely discussed phenomenon in the
broader literature on political science—and within the IR scholarship as well—especially
in the U.S.-Indonesia relations.3 Despite the vast amount of political science and IR
scholarship on this topic, scholars have devoted little attention to exploiting the FPE angle
on this topic. Hence, this academic exercise enriches both the FPE research agenda as
well as the discussion on U.S.-Indonesia diplomatic relations.
To produce salient FPE insights against this case, the article posits the research
question: did U.S. policymakers produce an effective and successful foreign policy over
Indonesia to resolve the 1999 East Timor Crisis? What are the key criteria that can be
accounted for such success or failure? More importantly, what is the lesson learned from
this episode of U.S. foreign policy for both American and Indonesia’s foreign
2
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policymakers? Borrowing David A. Baldwin’s (2000) framework in determining the
success and failure in foreign policy, the article argues that U.S. foreign policy was highly
successful based on three criteria: it attained the intended goals at a considerably high
degree; the attempt incurred a considerably low cost for the U.S. while inflicting the target
state with a high cost; and for the U.S. as the policy user, it involved a relatively lower
stake compared to Indonesia which had a relatively higher stake in the issue.
This article proceeds in the following manner to discuss this argument in a more
structured manner. First, it starts by outlining Baldwin’s (2000, pp. 171-176) criteria in
assessing foreign policy success and failure as the main analytical framework. Following
Baldwin’s framework, this article outlines process tracing in a case study setting as the
research methodology. It then examines Clinton’s decision as an influence attempt
towards Indonesia based on Baldwin’s criteria. Finally, it concludes with the lessons
learned for both U.S. and Indonesia policymakers to contemplate upon charting the future
relations for two nations by weighing the utility of the past policy against the context and
settings whereby the policy option was invoked.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Success seems to be a vague concept, henceforth estimating the evaluation of successful
and failed foreign policy brings at least another additional layer of analytical difficulty.
To address the problem, this article employs one of the tools of foreign policy analysis
coined by David A. Baldwin (2000). Baldwin asserts that one needs to consider at least
three criteria to assess the success and failure in foreign policy: effectiveness in attaining
goals; cost incurred both to the user and the target; and stakes for the user and the target.

Effectiveness in Attaining Goals
Baldwin (2000, pp. 173-174) notes that since policies are goal-oriented, effectiveness in
attaining goals constitutes one of the essential criteria in estimating the success and failure
in foreign policy. Furthermore, he adds three propositions in building the argument in
determining the effectiveness in attaining goals: policy usually pursue multiple goals with
multiple targets; policy change is not the same with behavioural change; and Herbert
Simon’s (1947, p. 176) argument that goal attainment is only a matter of degree.
Complementing these three points, Baldwin also acknowledges Robert Dahl’s (1957)
argument that policy may produce a negative effect in terms of goal attainment.
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Cost to the User and the Target
The second criterion involves the cost incurred both for the user in conducting the
influence attempt, as well as the cost affected—potentially and immediately—to the
target states. Baldwin borrows the rationale in taking cost as one of the user-side criteria
to estimate policy success from Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom. According to Dahl
and Lindblom (1953, pp. 38-39), any policy should be rationally designed to maximise
the net goal achievement to the extent it is also efficient. Regretfully, as Baldwin adds,
scholars rarely incorporate cost as the criteria in estimating the success of foreign policy
instruments. On the other hand, the cost to the target of an influence attempt is more often
to be incorporated as a measure to estimate policy success (Dahl, 1976). In Baldwin’s
(2000, p. 175) word, “the higher the cost for non-compliance … the more successful it
is.” Baldwin (2000, p. 175) also considers the opposing notion that cost for noncompliance should not be included in estimating policy success as noncompliance itself
indicates a total failure of the policy (Pape, 1996, p. 197). However, Baldwin (2000, p.
175) deems such view would be misleading as he refers to Thomas Schelling (1984, p.
274) and Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981, p. 90) logics that a target’s noncompliance
behaviour might imply an effort to impose significant cost towards the policy user.

Stake for the User and the Target
The third criterion deals with stakes, both for the user and the target. Using stakes as an
estimate, Baldwin advises looking at how each actor values the achievement of foreign
policy goals. Weighing the user side of stake in estimating success is relatively simpler,
“… the bigger the stakes, the more valuable is the degree of achievement, the more
successful is the influence attempt” (Baldwin, 2000, p. 176). Based on the target’s stakes,
Baldwin (2000, p. 176) asserts that estimating success also needs to consider the difficulty
of achieving the policy goals in estimating the value of the achievement: a harder task in
achieving the objective results in an increase of the achievement value.
Taken together, these criteria serve as the building blocks in Baldwin’s framework
to estimate the success and failure in foreign policy. Baldwin’s analytical framework for
assessing an influence attempt is arguably best summarised in Table 1 below. The
following section then briefly covers the research methodology to operate this analytical
framework.

4
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Table 1. David A. Baldwin Framework in Assessing Success and Failure
in Foreign Policy
Effectiveness in Attaining Goals

1.
2.
3.

Multiple goals and target
Policy vs. behavioural change
The degree of goal attainment

Cost Efficiency and
Effectiveness
1. Cost to the user
- potential cost
- actual cost
2. Cost to the target
- potential cost
- actual cost

Stakes
1. Stakes for the user
How user perceives the value of
an influence attempt.
2. Stakes for the target
How the target perceives the value
of the issue potentially increases
the difficulty of an influence
attempt.

Source: Baldwin (2000, pp. 173-176).

RESEARCH METHOD
This article proceeds with process tracing methodology in a case study setting (Vennesson
& Wiesner, 2014). The purpose of using this methodology is straightforward. It seeks to
reconstruct the process that leads to the outcome—whether the U.S. foreign policy to
Indonesia to resolve the 1999 East Timor crisis was success or failure—by assessing the
variables outlined in David Baldwin’s (2000) theoretical framework. In conducting the
analysis, the article is supported by both primary resources, such as news archive,
government documents, press releases, memoir, as well as secondary resources such as
published academic materials.4

DISCUSSION
In the previous sections, the article has outlined the analytical tools to guide the research
in estimating the success or failure in U.S. foreign policy over Indonesia in resolving the
1999 East Timor crisis. This case was a monumental episode on U.S.-Indonesia relations
which have been very dynamic despite its ups and downs (Murphy, 2010). Hence, before
the article proceeds with evaluating such foreign policy, it will provide a summary of
U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations to provide readers with more context.
During the Cold War, subsequent U.S. governments also had a big part in shaping
Indonesia’s policy in East Timor. Starting with the Ford administration in the mid-1970s,
the U.S. government had paid some attention towards the then-Portuguese Timor and
even gave tacit approval to Indonesia for its annexation plan in 1975 (Arif, 2013, p. 201).5
Indonesia’s military campaign—which began on 7 December 1975 and lasted about a
year— successfully deposed the FRETILIN-led (The Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor) state of East Timor, and annexed the region as Indonesia’s 27th
province (Markas Besar ABRI, 2000, pp. 145-154).6
5
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In the aftermath of the annexation, Indonesia kept sustaining resistance from the
East Timorese and responded to the resistance using ABRI’s (Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed Force) repressive means dubbed as “security
operations” —an approach that later on revealed to be very costly for the Indonesian
image. By the late 1980s, Indonesia’s occupation was estimated to have caused ten
thousand deaths of the East Timorese population caused by killings, hunger, and illness
(Silva & Ball, 2006, p. 10). In the early 1990s, members of the international community
began to change their stances towards Indonesia on the East Timor issue in the aftermath
of the Santa Cruz Massacre, in which ABRI committed gross violence against civilians
on 12 November 1991 (Braithwaite et al., 2012). While most governments around the
world condemned the act, some had taken more serious measures including halting their
aid programme to Indonesia. The United Nations (UN) responded by passing Resolution
No. 1993/97 in which Indonesia had to oblige to a set of conditions including facilitating
the visit of UN Special Rapporteur in the following year (UN. Commission on Human
Rights, 1993).
Within the U.S. policy community, the Santa Cruz Massacre attracted divided
responses. The George H.W. Bush administration did not pursue strong criticism, showed
only mild concern for the post-massacre justice process, and even supported Indonesia at
UN General Assembly (“Washington Pressuring Indonesia”, 1991; ETAN, 1997; “U.S.
Regrets East Timor Violence”, 1991). By contrast, members of the U.S. legislative branch
had urged the Bush administration to take firmer stances towards Indonesia (AFP, 1991a).
In addition, the U.S. Congress also passed a bill banning Indonesia from participating in
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme in 1992 (Quinn,
1992). When the U.S. leadership was handed over to President Bill Clinton in 1993, it
had an eagerness to work with the Indonesian government rather than paying attention to
the East Timor problems despite its commitment to humanitarian issues (“U.N. resolution
vote may signal shift”, 1993). The Clinton administration had restored the ExpandedIMET (E-IMET) Programme in 1993 and repeatedly conveyed its intention to resume
military-to-military training with Indonesia in 1994 (“House vs. White House”, 1994;
Rabasa & Haseman, 2002, p. 113; “U.S. Keen to Sell Weapons”, 1995).7 The
administration also began talks on transferring selective military equipment—which
includes nine F-16 Jet Fighters—in 1995, yet decided to review and postpone the arms
sale due to Indonesia’s use of the coercive measure in handling the political oppositions
in mid-1996.
6
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By the late 1990s, Indonesia experienced a massive and turbulent change which
led to a disruption in its relations with the U.S. and its East Timor policy. In June 1997,
President Suharto decided to back down from the E-IMET programme and refused the F16 sale due to his weariness with U.S. Congress “unjustified criticism” (Niksch, 1998,
pp. 7-9). Subsequently, Indonesia decided to eye for the Russian Sukhoi-30MK jet fighter
and Mi-17 helicopter, yet it was suspended when the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis hit
Indonesia (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002, p. 115). In addition, the financial crisis also created
political and economic crises which brought Suharto to his downfall in May 1998. He
was replaced by B.J. Habibie – one of Suharto’s protégé who previously served as VicePresident (Mydans, 1998).
Under President Habibie, Indonesia engaged in a new policy direction towards
East Timor (Braithwaite et al., 2012, p. 92), starting with his request to the UN for holding
a referendum in East Timor. On 5 May 1999, as a follow up to Habibie’s request, the UN
invited Indonesia and Portugal as the former colonial authority of East Timor to discuss
the question of East Timor future. Eventually, the three parties agreed that the referendum
was going to be held on 8 August 1999. The referendum was on 30 August 1999, three
weeks after the first-proposed date (Sebastian & Smith, 2000). The referendum resulted
in East Timorese rejecting special autonomy from Indonesia and opted for independence.
The result was announced on 4 September 1999. The military-backed, pro-Indonesia
militia responded to the result with a scorched earth policy causing mass violence and
displaced the entire population. To prevent the crisis from escalating any further, the
international community demanded Indonesia to allow security forces to enter East Timor
and to take over the authority from the Indonesian military (Crossette, 1999). Facing
repeated demands, the Indonesian government remained unwilling to relent its authority
to the international forces, claiming it was still capable of controlling and stabilising the
condition in East Timor.
These accounts show that the U.S. had repeatedly pursued influence attempts
toward Indonesia intending to change Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor. The U.S.
Congress remained the most vocal foreign policy actor towards Indonesia even though
both the Bush and Clinton administrations had directed several lenient policies towards
Suharto’s New Order regime. However, whereas most U.S. Congress-sanctioned attempts
had appeared to be relatively less effective—considering how both Presidents Suharto
and Habibie had only made a little adjustment to Indonesia’s military policy—it was
President Clinton’s decision on the eve of 1999 APEC Summit that eventually achieved
7
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greater effectiveness (Niksch, 1999). Reiterating President Clinton’s statement on
Thursday 9 September 1999, his decision towards Indonesia was,
“…suspension of all programs of military cooperation with Indonesia, effective
immediately. Our military leaders have made crystal clear to senior military
officials in Indonesia what they must do to restore our confidence… our
intentions are 1) to stop military-to-military cooperation right now, until this
matter gets resolved, and 2) we have sent a clear signal about what we will do on
economic cooperation if it is not resolved,” (“The Fate of East Timor”, 1999).

The policy statement implied that the Clinton administration had decided to (1) suspend
US-Indonesia military cooperation, (2) threaten further economic sanctions, and (3) work
with international financial institutions to halt the financial aid.8 The following day, on
10 September 1999, the decisions to suspend all military cooperation with Indonesia and
to pause U.S. funded financial aid to Indonesia effectively took place (Niksch, 1999).
These policies were in place until Indonesia let the international community help in
handling the East Timor Crisis (“The Fate of East Timor”, 1999). On 12 September 1999,
just two days after Clinton’s address, President B.J. Habibie announced a change of his
policy. He commanded the Indonesian military to withdraw from East Timor, let the
U.N.-authorised peacekeeping forces enter and help Indonesia in solving the East Timor
violence (“World: Asia-Pacific”, 1999). On 19 October 1999, the then-newly elected
Indonesian legislative council announced the decision that respected the referendum
result and ended Indonesia’s occupation in East Timor (de Mello & Shihab, 2000).
Understanding this context, the article proceeds in employing Baldwin’s three
criteria in assessing President Clinton’s decision. By framing President Clinton as the
user of foreign policy, his decision as a form of foreign policy, and the Habibie
administration as a policy target it continues with the following analysis.

Policy Effectiveness in Attaining Intended Goals
President Clinton had aimed towards multiple objectives with his decision towards
Indonesia. Indeed, his primary intention was to demand Indonesia to stop the mass
violence in East Timor. However, as the U.S. had lost its confidence in ABRI to maintain
the situation in East Timor, President Clinton viewed that Indonesia needed to invite the
international security forces to undergo such an objective. To reiterate his word,
8
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“…Indonesian Government and military are responsible for the safety of the East
Timorese and of the U.N. mission there. If Indonesia does not end the violence,
it must invite, it must invite the international community to assist in restoring
security. It must allow international relief agencies to help people on the ground.
It must move forward with the transition to independence.” (“The Fate of East
Timor”, 1999)

In addition, the Clinton administration had other goals which revolved around the need
to reassure U.S. partners and allies to pledge stronger commitment in the future of East
Timor. As the previous section has briefly addressed, Clinton was addressing the demands
of Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres,
and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for pledging U.S. commitment to the East Timor
issue. The nature of these demands would also affect how the Clinton administration had
perceived the stake. Hence, Clinton was obliged to reassure U.S. allies and the United
Nations that his administration was determined to support the UN-sanctioned peace
process in East Timor.
In summary, Clinton’s objectives were (1) to push Indonesia in terminating the
military operation in East Timor and opening East Timor for the entry of international
peacekeeping forces to end the violence, restore order, and to let relief agencies provide
aid; and (2) to reassure U.S. allies and the UN that his administration remains committed
to support the process of transferring independence to East Timor peacefully. Having
identified Clinton’s objectives, it is then imperative to ask two interrelated questions.
First, how effective was Clinton’s foreign policy in achieving these goals? Second, would
the East Timor humanitarian crisis end well without Clinton’s influence attempt towards
Indonesia?
There was an initial scepticism that Clinton’s decision to employ military sanction
and threaten economic sanction would not be effective in changing Indonesia’s policy nor
stopping the violence on the ground. It was a fair scepticism based on two reasons: first,
economic sanctions were considered to have a long-term impact rather than a short one
(“Australia Says Sanctions”, 1999); secondly, as Indonesia was undergoing a political
change – by which, ABRI remained as an important political actor at the time – Indonesia
might not perceive the intended pressure and act according to the demands (Rinakit, 2005,
p. 6; “Army Is Still”, 1999).
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At the time of Clinton’s address, Indonesia indeed had proven to be an unreliable
target given that it had passed the 48 hours deadline set by both the UN and the Australian
Government to prove that enacting martial law was effective in stopping the violence in
East Timor (“Jakarta Given UN Deadline”, 1999; “Australia steps up”, 1999). Despite the
situation in East Timor was improving on 9 September, Habibie failed to prove that the
martial law was effective and reneged the “unrealistic deadline” as his administration
claimed (“Jakarta Seeks ‘Realistic’ Deadline”, 1999). Eventually, UN Secretary-General
Annan gave an additional 24-hour extension to the deadline (“U.N. Sees 'Marginal'
Improvement”, 1999; “Annan gives Indonesia”, 1999). However, Habibie remained
adamant in refusing UN peacekeeping forces to enter East Timor, though he allowed UN
observers to assess the situation on the ground (“Indonesia agrees to let UN”, 1999; “PM's
SETBACK”, 1999; "Habibie's Future", 1999). ABRI Commander-in-Chief General
Wiranto who had accompanied the UN observers found himself surprised when he
witnessed the first-hand situation in Dili on 11 September (Nevins, 2005, pp. 105-107).
As Joseph Nevins (2005, p. 107) notes, such experience would change General Wiranto’s
position on the need for the international security force’s assistance.
Back at Jakarta, the Habibie administration received Clinton’s address with a grim
response. Even the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Ginandjar Kartasasmita
protested the policy by stating that Clinton should not utilise IMF and World Bank as
tools of influence (“Jakarta warns IMF”, 1999). While such comment was unsettling, it
implied that the Habibie administration was carefully weighing Clinton’s statement and
opening to the option for peacekeeping force (“Indonesia says may accept peacekeepers”,
1999). On 11 September 1999, the pressure on Indonesia was heightened as Clinton
received a report that led him to acknowledge that ABRI had been aiding the recent
militia’s raid on the UN mission in Dili (“East Timor Crisis”, 1999). Previously, the
Clinton administration had never acknowledged ABRI’s involvement in militia’s attacks
on civilians and UN officials. On 12 September 1999, Clinton (1999) made another
statement citing the incident and discussing U.S. policy response in a meeting with
American and Asian Business leaders during the APEC Summit in New Zealand. In
addition, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, had warned that Indonesia
faced a “point of no return” in international relations if it did not accept the peacekeeping
forces (Dodd & Hartcher, 1999; Fernandes, 2008, p. 90). Eventually, the change in U.S.
attitude was the final nail in the coffin for Indonesia that led President Habibie to call a
special cabinet meeting discussing its East Timor policy on the same day. The meeting
10
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concluded with a statement from President Habibie announcing that his administration
would yield to the international demand to let international security forces enter East
Timor (“World: Asia-Pacific”, 1999).
Initially, there were doubts regarding President Habibie’s statement, as he was
deemed a weak leader and incapable of harnessing ABRI which controlled the uniformed
and ununiformed forces operating in East Timor (“World asks”, 1999). Without ABRI’s
full cooperation, any peacekeeping forces would risk themselves getting into a conflict
with the pro-Indonesia militia or worse, the ABRI forces. After all, some ABRI high
ranking officers had repeatedly threatened to pursue a scorched earth policy and to engage
the peacekeeping forces if they landed in East Timor. However, the situation was quite
clear when President Habibie emerged with General Wiranto to make the 12 September
speech. The appearance of General Wiranto—who held the dual position of ABRI
Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence and Security—signalled ABRI’s
alignment with President Habibie on the issue of East Timor (Fernandes, 2008, p. 95).
The effectiveness of Clinton’s policy also owed itself to U.S. official engagements
with Indonesia’s military leaders. The military relationship had been critical in conveying
each government’s intentions (Fernandes, 2008, p. 94). Before Clinton addressed the East
Timor issue on 9 September, U.S. senior officials had conveyed the administration’s
intentions on East Timor towards Indonesia’s political and military leaders. On 8
September, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces in the
Pacific, had personally visited General Wiranto to inform the suspension of US-Indonesia
military ties (“The White House: Press briefing”, 1999). In addition, U.S. Armed Forces
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, made several phone calls
to General Wiranto demanding ABRI to cooperate with the UN mission after UNAMET
announced the result of the East Timor referendum on 4 September 1999.
Arguably, Clinton’s military-to-military engagement had paid off well. By the
time Clinton made a U.S. statement on East Timor, General Wiranto had already
appointed Major General Kiki Syahnakri—a military reformist who was knowledgeable
on East Timor—as the martial law administrator in East Timor (Dunn, 2002, pp. 85-86).
When Habibie decided to allow international peacekeeping forces into East Timor, Major
General Syahnakri obeyed and stated that he would remain in Dili until the peacekeeping
forces arrived. He then welcomed Major General Peter Cosgrove—commander of the
International Forces in East Timor (InterFET)—and left when President Habibie lifted
the martial law (Dunn, 2002, p. 97).
11
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Furthermore, the military aspect of U.S. foreign policy was critical in attaining the
second objectives which were to reassure its allies and the UN that the Clinton
administration remained committed to supporting the process of transferring
independence to East Timor. After all, there had been next to no signal indicating that the
Clinton administration would commit resources to the peace process preceding the East
Timor referendum. However, Clinton decided to shift his foreign policy after receiving
pressures from U.S. allies – prominently Australia and Portugal – and the UN. Clinton’s
policy reversal eventually led to the U.S. committing barely minimum military resources
that signified U.S. commitment in the eyes of its allies.
How effective was Clinton’s policy in achieving the second objective? I would
argue that the U.S. was effective in reassuring its commitment based on two points. First,
U.S. had changed its complacency towards a more assertive manner in dealing with
Indonesia’s policy on East Timor. Second, by engaging Indonesia more assertively, U.S.
had marshalled sufficient resources in the pursuit of a common goal with other U.S. allies.
In addition, these two points could contribute—at least positively—to effectively
achieving the primary objective.
As previously discussed, U.S. had approached Indonesia delicately, especially on
sensitive issues like the independence of East Timor (“Moving Gently”, 1999). However,
Indonesia’s regime change, the UN-supervised referendum, and the subsequent mass
violence in East Timor changed the whole US–Indonesia relations. Siding with
Indonesia’s government on the issue of East Timor turned into a liability, which may
harm the U.S. relationship with its allies. The liability could be perceived as real. By 2
September 1999, just two days after the referendum took place, Portugal had raised its
concern over the level of violence in East Timor (“Portugal asks UN”, 1999). By contrast,
Australia—another U.S. long term ally—showed more hesitation than Portugal.
However, the Government of Australia changed its stances when the mass violence
occurred after the announcement of the referendum result.
When Clinton delivered his speech on East Timor on 9 September 1999, he was
both showing assertiveness in U.S. foreign policy and addressing U.S. international allies’
doubts regarding his administration’s commitment. In his address, Clinton pointed out the
necessity for Indonesia to invite international peacekeeping forces, and his
administration’s willingness to support and to give Australia a bigger leadership part in
the peacekeeping force. Following Indonesia’s invitation and U.S. commitment, the UN
Security Council proceeded to authorise a multinational force to restore peace and
12
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security in East Timor (UN Security Council, 1999). Eventually, the U.S. sent 200
military personnel—including communications, intelligence, and transportation
specialists—along with equipment to the multinational force’s operation (Dinger, 2000,
p. 9).
In summary, the U.S. had achieved a high degree of effectiveness in attaining the
primary and secondary goals. In attaining its primary objective, the U.S. was highly
effective considering that it managed to influence Indonesia’s stance and policy on East
Timor. The U.S. was also effective in engaging both key civilian and military players in
Indonesian politics, a vital move that contributed well to the whole policy. On the
secondary objective, the U.S. was relatively effective considering that it sufficiently
satisfied the demand of its allies—both Portugal and Australia—to take sides in
pressuring Indonesia. In addition, the U.S. also committed some military resources to the
peacekeeping operations as a gesture that signified its commitment. Without the influence
attempt, it would be less likely for Indonesia to yield to the demand of the international
community. The Indonesian military might have just perpetually resorted back to use
violence to control the East Timorese population.

Cost to the United States and Indonesia
Cost remains an important element in estimating the success and failure of foreign policy.
Without assessing the cost of a policy, one might estimate that the policy could be
effective without realising that it might have damaged oneself in the process. On the user
side, the previous subsection had briefly mentioned that the Clinton administration tended
to avoid excessive cost when conducting the influence attempt on Indonesia’s policy
towards East Timor. U.S. cost avoidance behaviour was induced by the U.S. experience
that committing a military operation to undergo humanitarian intervention would cost the
U.S. treasuries hundreds even billions of dollars.9 At the time, U.S. had already engaged
in humanitarian intervention in Kosovo—a conflict that had already cost U.S. coffers
millions even billions of dollars (O’Hanlon, 2000). Considering such cost, the Clinton
administration had devised a contingency plan to shift the cost of conducting intervention
by letting Australia to lead the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping forces should the need arise
for one (Dinger, 2000, pp. 8-9). Moreover, the threat of economic sanctions would not
harm the U.S. economy considering that at the time U.S. was already in a trade deficit
with Indonesia (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021a). Based on the economic calculation alone,
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President Clinton’s decision to employ sanctions was arguably more cost-effective
compared to other tools of statecraft.
Apart from the economic cost, U.S. leadership was also factoring in the political
cost carefully when it was about to conduct the influence attempts towards Indonesia. At
the time, Indonesia was considered an important political and economic actor in South
East Asia. Furthermore, Indonesia was undergoing a regime change and had just
completed its national election. In addition, U.S. had developed military-to-military
cooperation between U.S. Armed Forces and ABRI (Inkiriwang, 2020, pp. 378-379).
Though it was not formalised into a military alliance, the military ties between the two
countries could be traced back to the Cold War era. Hence, an influence attempt towards
Indonesia would risk endangering the long-fostered relationship and greatly reducing
U.S. influence over Indonesia’s political and military leaders.
Arguably, the U.S. government understood both the economic and political
consequences well when Clinton finally made the call. By employing both military
sanctions and threatening economic sanctions over Indonesia, Clinton had minimised the
immediate cost that it had to endure if he had opted for a military intervention towards
Indonesia. However, Clinton had taken a moderate political risk that would eventually
alienate U.S. influence over Indonesia’s political and military elite. Eventually, USIndonesia military-to-military relationship was restored when George W. Bush met with
President Megawati Soekarnoputri in 2003 (Inkiriwang, 2020, p. 382).
On the other hand, Clinton’s decision had incurred perilous economic and political
costs towards Indonesia. At the time, Indonesia was undergoing a national economic
recovery programme funded by the IMF and World Bank. The international financial
institutions were supposed to pump a total of US$ 12.9 billion into Indonesia, in which
U.S. had contributed about US$ 8 billion to the plan (Kivimaki, 2000). In 1999, the
financial institutions were supposed to dispense another US$ 3.3 billion as part of the
economic package (Kivimaki, 2000, p. 528). Halting the funds would jeopardise
Indonesia’s economic recovery programme that would potentially bring Indonesia back
to the level when it experienced the 1997 Asian financial crises. In addition, Clinton’s
threat to halt economic cooperation between the two countries would create another huge
problem for the Indonesian economy. As previously mentioned, Indonesia was enjoying
a trade surplus with the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021b). The consequences would be
disastrous for Indonesia if the U.S. had decided to cut off its economic relations.
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Apart from the economic cost, the political cost for Indonesia was equally
immense. As previously discussed, Indonesia had been undergoing political reform and
nearing a leadership transition through the 1999 national election. Initially, the postreferendum massacre had attracted international pressures towards Indonesia. These
pressures had created distrust towards the Indonesian leaders which potentially led to
instability within the regime. Even before President Habibie enacted the martial law in
East Timor, there were rumours that ABRI would attempt a coup d’état on President
Habibie. Clinton’s decision had made the matters worse. When Habibie responded to the
international demand in opening up East Timor, he risked off inciting another political
instability, or at the minimum, losing the upcoming election in October 1999. In his
memoir, Habibie (2006, p. 104) notes that Indonesia was facing a potential disintegration
due to the unstable political and economic situation. Eventually, President Habibie
dropped out of the presidential race after the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat RI, MPR RI) passed a vote of no confidence against
his formal account (“Indonesia's Habibie Drops Out”, 1999).
In addition, President Clinton’s decision also imposed a hefty cost on the
Indonesian military. While previously the cost for the U.S. can be measured through the
loss of U.S. influence towards the Indonesian military, the Indonesian military had
formally lost the credibility to engage with the U.S. military. The implication was quite
dire: TNI had missed the opportunity to U.S. arms transfer, as well as training and
education for officer corps (Inkiriwang, 2020, p. 385). Consequently, Indonesia had to
turn for Russian armaments and diverged its weapons systems for subsequent
modernisation programme before the sanctions were fully lifted in 2005 (“Indonesia seeks
more Sukhois”, 2004). Apart from formal consequences, “losing” East Timor also
damaged the Indonesian military’s source of informal business—as the military was
engaged in profitable ventures during its occupation in East Timor (Moore, 2001, p. 29).
In sum, this subsection has found that Clinton’s decision was particularly cost-efficient
in minimising the loss of U.S. political and economic resources while imposing a
considerably high cost to Indonesian political and military elites. However, it was also
fair to argue that such a decision was a gamble that pushed both Indonesian political and
military elites to their limits. With that, this article proceeds with the last criteria.
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Stake for the United States and Indonesia
In the previous section, Baldwin reminds that in estimating stakes, one needs to look at
how much the user values the foreign policy achievement. However, assessing Clinton’s
decision was problematic considering that initially his administration had less stake on
the issue of East Timor (“The White House: Press briefing”, 1999). Even the Bush
administration had also displayed less attention and viewed Suharto’s presidency as of
bigger importance than the issue of East Timor. One of the primary reasons why the U.S.
viewed its relationship with Indonesia as strategic was because Indonesia was located at
the strategic sea lanes of communication, which served as an important trade route for the
U.S. (“U.S. Department of State”, 1999). While the view has been traditionally accepted
within U.S. policy circles, several conditions would affect the dynamics of U.S. stake
over a particular foreign policy issue.
Arguably, the conditions that managed to alter the U.S. perception was the
international pressure from the UN, as well as the governments of Australia and Portugal
(“UN Annan's statement”, 1999). Reportedly, both Australian Prime Minister Howard
and his Foreign Minister Downer criticised the Clinton administration publicly and
pushed for more U.S. commitment in peacekeeping force (Braithwaite et al., 2012, pp.
100-101). Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres also threatened Clinton that he would pull
Portuguese troops if Clinton did not provide support for a peacekeeping operation.
Portugal was a vital U.S. ally on U.S. humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. In addition,
Prime Minister Guterres had prevented 16 U.S. military flights from departing the Azores
air base—a strategic airbase for U.S. operations in the Middle East (Braithwaite et al.,
2012, p. 101).
In addition, Clinton was also answering to domestic political demands. In
particular, the strategic planners within his administration were under heavy duress by
U.S. Congress demands (Braithwaite et al., 2012, p. 101). The works of East Timor
Action Network (ETAN) and other U.S. activism organisations were paying off.10
Previously, only a few members of the U.S. Congress claimed to be sympathetic to the
East Timor cause, including Senators Patrick Leahy and Russ Feingold. Both senators
were important figures who introduced and rallied for the bills banning the cooperation
between the U.S. and the Indonesian military. However, nearing the end of the 48-hours
deadline set by the UN, these senators successfully rallied support in pushing President
Clinton to make a firm decision regarding Indonesia’s East Timor policy. The pressure
eventually raised Clinton’s stake on the East Timor issue.
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On the other hand, Indonesia had a considerably higher stake in East Timor,
especially during Suharto’s New Order. By the time Habibie had taken the presidential
position from Suharto, the stake was rather ambiguous. On one hand, President Habibie
and the civilian leadership had sent a clear signal that they were eager to accommodate
the U.N.-sanctioned East Timor independence process (Habibie, 2006, pp. 395-401). On
the other hand, the existence of elements in the military that wanted to pursue scorched
earth policy if the referendum resulted in independence showed that the military’s stake
was divided (“East Timor's Troubles”, 1999).
The divided voices within the Indonesian elite then faced the harsh reality that the
referendum resulted in mass violence which was either instigated by the militia or the
Indonesian military. Facing such a condition, the leadership in Jakarta sought to tackle
the problem on its own: by imposing martial law. On one hand, President Habibie and the
civilian leadership repeatedly refused UN peacekeeping forces to help because they
believed that the mass violence occurred in East Timor, which at the time remained within
Indonesia’s sovereignty. Such a reason echoed within ABRI-ranks, although the exact
motivation to endure sanctions and threats remained questionable. However, as Habibie
enacted the martial law and trusted Major General Syahnakri as its administrator, it was
clear that the military had been aligned with the civilian leadership. Henceforth, the
Indonesian political and military elites had the same view on how both actors perceived
East Timor as Indonesia’s stake.
In assessing Indonesia’s stake, it is important to consider the difficulty that the
U.S. had to undertake during the influence attempt. In my view, the U.S. had arguably
experienced difficulty not when Clinton enacted the decision, but when it had to perceive
the signals from Indonesia and to assess whether Indonesia might comply or refuse the
international demand. When Indonesia had accepted the demand, it was clear that
Indonesia was still able to exploit room for negotiation with the U.S. This indicated that
the U.S. was successful in subduing Indonesia to let go of the high stake.

CONCLUSION
The 1999 East Timor humanitarian crisis was a prime example of a case when the U.S.
had to conduct an influence attempt towards Indonesia—a high-risk and high-stake
target—who posed as a “trouble state” (Murphy, 2010). The article finds that the U.S.
influence attempt was highly successful. This finding is supported by three reasons. First,
it effectively attained the intended primary and secondary objectives. Second, the attempt
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was conducted efficiently while inflicting a high cost on both Indonesia’s political and
military leaders. Lastly, U.S. successfully captured the policy objectives without having
a higher stake on the issue.
From this case, both Indonesian and U.S. Policymakers can learn transcending
insight that can be adopted across different time and context. First, going beyond Anne
Marie Murphy’s (2010, p. 383) argument, national interest should not only dictate how
policymakers shape the policy’s objective, but also their willingness to accept the cost,
and how they value the issue at hand. Aligning these three factors to national interest is
crucial when policymakers must decide the optimal policy among various options. Tilting
the balance that goes a bit against the national interest can produce ineffective or even
unsuccessful policy.
In addition, policymakers also need to maintain some strategic manoeuvrability
after the conclusion of any influence attempt. While the effective policy is consciously
devised to achieve the intended goals, as Baldwin (2000) forewarns, it might also produce
unintended negative consequences. In this regard, the intervention had set the U.S. image
as a unilateralist power, whereas the U.S views that Indonesia is full of ardent nationalist
sentiment (Murphy, 2010, p. 383). On military-to-military relations, the intervention had
made Indonesia constantly cautious of becoming too reliant on U.S. military hardware
(Inkiriwang, 2020). Taken as a whole, these two lessons could guide the policymakers in
charting future relations between both nations.
From this research, the article concludes that evaluating another country’s foreign
policy through a set of reliable criteria can indeed produce policy-relevant knowledge for
decision-makers. It suggests that scholars also examine the output aspect of a certain
country’s foreign policy. This exercise would enable scholars to compare the various
foreign policy tools that any particular state can utilise given the limitation and guide
policy actors to choose the most feasible policy option.
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To reiterate the problem, it is far more accessible to find a study of foreign policy analysis (FPA), which focus on the
process of foreign policymaking, rather than foreign policy evaluation (FPE), which focus on the output of foreign
policy. Even the essential primers on Indonesia’s foreign policy mostly fall into the realm of FPA. Above all, see
Michael Leifer (1983), Franklin B. Weinstein (1976), Leo Suryadinata (1996), and Rizal Sukma (2008). On the other
hand, literature on FPE remains scarce and, as Baldwin highlights, full of “analytical anarchy”. One of the prime
example of such article—which again, focuses on U.S. foreign policy—was Egalita Irfan’s (2014) piece on assessing
U.S. drone strike in Pakistan.
The East Timor crisis—and the preceding episodes of Indonesia’s security policy over its former province—is a topic
that has been widely discussed in various discipline. Within the Political Science and International Relations
scholarship, these include—among other literature—analysis of Indonesia’s foreign policy making (Arif, 2013; Poole,
2015), U.S.-Indonesia relations (Murphy, 2010), the anatomy of the East Timor conflict (Dunn, 2002; Nevins, 2005),
the East Timor experience as form of humanitarian intervention (Sebastian & Smith, 2000), and Indonesia-Australia
relations (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, & Soares, 2012).
3

4

For similar treatment with the primary data, see Priyandita (2019).

Muhamad Arif’s study depends on several primary sources on U.S. diplomatic relations with Indonesia which includes
memorandum, documents, and telegrams from the Department of State.
5

6

Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, abbreviated as FRETILIN, was one of the major East Timorese
political factions engaged in a civil war before the Indonesian invasion in 1975.
7

E-IMET was specially designed to educate and to train Indonesian military officers on judicial and human rights
issues.
8 The following day, the undersecretary for U.S. Treasury Lawrence Summers gave the statement that the administration

would work with IMF and World Bank to halt financial aid to Indonesia. See “U.S. wants Indonesia” (1999).
9

To provide a comparison, U.S. peacekeeping operation in Kosovo costed between US$ 3-4 billion throughout
September 1999 alone. See “Washington Refuses to Consider” (1999).
10

ETAN has compiled a comprehensive list of congressional action on East Timor & Indonesia. See ETAN (2004).
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